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21. Introduction
Against a backdrop of fiscal consolidation in developed countries, the Laffer
curve, i.e., the inverted-U -shaped relation between fiscal revenues and tax rates,
has recently received considerable attention; see, among many others, D’Erasmo et
al. (2016), Guner et al. (2016), Holter et al. (2014), and Trabandt and Uhlig (2011,
2012). In this context, the Laffer curve has proven a useful tool to quantify the
available fiscal space.
In this paper, we study issues related to the shape of the Laffer curve in the
context of a neoclassical growth model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous,
liquidity-constrained agents (hereafter, IM). We show that in an IM economy, there
is no sense in which one can define a Laffer curve abstracting from whether debt or
transfers are chosen to balance the government budget constraint. This is because
the interest rate itself is not invariant to debt and transfers, contrary to what
happens in a representative agent (RA) setup (see Aiyagari and McGrattan, 1998).
To address this issue, we develop the concept of conditional Laffer curves. Hold-
ing public debt constant, we vary transfers and adjust one tax rate accordingly.
This yields a relation linking fiscal revenues to the tax rate conditional on transfers.
By holding transfers constant and varying debt, we can similarly define a Laffer
curve conditional on public debt. In an RA setup, the two conditional Laffer curves
coincide, which is the mere reflection of the irrelevance of public debt and transfers
for the equilibrium allocation and price system.1 In an IM setup, however, the
picture changes dramatically.
While the Laffer curve conditional on transfers has the traditional inverted-
U shape, its counterpart conditional on debt looks like a horizontal S. In this
case, there can be one, two, or three tax rates compatible with a given level of
1In other words, given a change in distortionary taxes, the resulting allocation does not depend
on transfers and/or public debt, which is just Ricardian equivalence at play.
3fiscal revenues. The regular part of this curve (the part that indeed looks like an
inverted U) is associated with positive government debt, while the odd part (the
part that makes the curve look like a horizontal S) is associated with negative debt
levels.
To understand this odd shape, consider a situation such that the debt-output
ratio becomes negative, say, because the government is now accumulating assets.
There are two effects at work here. Obviously, if government wealth increases,
the fiscal burden declines, calling for a lower tax rate to balance the budget con-
straint. This is the standard force present in an RA framework. However, in an
IM context, there is another force at work: The interest rate decreases when gov-
ernment wealth increases. Other things equal, this reduces government revenues,
calling for higher taxes. For sufficiently negative government debt, the second force
dominates, leading to the oddly shaped Laffer curve conditional on debt.
In practice, the key question is whether the odd portion of the Laffer curve
conditional on debt is relevant from an empirical point of view or a mere theoretical
curiosity.
Defining debt as government liabilities net of financial assets and using a long
data set featuring all the G7 countries, based on Piketty and Zucman (2014),
we find occurrences of negative public debt for Japan, Germany, and the United
Kingdom. One can alternatively define public debt as government liabilities net
of non-financial assets (e.g., administrative buildings, subsoil, intangibles such as
artistic originals). This alternative definition is somewhat contentious because the
National Accounts assume a zero net return on non-financial assets. However,
it provides a rough assessment of government net wealth. Under this definition,
negative public debt is pervasive. We conclude from both perspectives, that the
odd part of the Laffer curve conditional on debt is not a theoretical curiosity.
4To explore these issues, we consider a prototypical neoclassical model along
the lines of Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) and Flode´n (2001). In this economy,
households are subject to persistent, uninsurable, idiosyncratic productivity shocks
and face a borrowing constraint. The model includes distortionary taxes on labor,
capital, and consumption. These taxes are used to finance a constant share of
government consumption in output, lump-sum transfers, and interest repayments
on accumulated debt. While the model is very simple and essentially qualitative, we
strive to take it seriously to the data, matching key moments of earning and wealth
distributions. We then study the steady-state conditional Laffer curves associated
with each of the three taxes considered.
Our main findings are the following. First, when transfers are varied, the Laffer
curves in the IM economy look broadly like their RA counterparts. In our bench-
mark calibration, the revenue-maximizing labor income tax rate hardly differs from
its RA counterpart. We reach similar conclusions when considering capital income
and consumption taxes. Second, when debt is varied instead of transfers, the reg-
ular part of the Laffer curve is similar to its RA counterpart. However, whenever
debt is negative, the two curves differ sharply, confirming the insight drawn from
the above discussion. A corollary of our results is that the Laffer curves (condi-
tional on transfers) are not invariant to the level of public indebtedness. This is
potentially very important in the current context of high public debt-output ratios
in the US and other advanced economies. It turns out that the Laffer curves are
only mildly affected by the debt-output ratio, provided that the latter is positive.
However, for negative levels of public debt, we find that the Laffer curve associ-
ated with capital income taxes can be higher than its benchmark counterpart. Our
results are robust to a series of model perturbations, such as lower labor supply
elasticities, lower shares of government spending, alternative calibration targets for
5the debt-output ratio, alternative utility functions, and alternative processes for
individual productivity.
This paper is related to previous studies investigating taxation and/or public
debt in an IM setup. A first strand, exemplified by Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998)
and Flode´n (2001) , established that a proportional income tax rate changes non-
monotonically with debt. However, this literature did not explore how this feature
could impact the shape of the Laffer curve. Ro¨hrs and Winter (2015) recently
extended this analysis to a carefully calibrated multi-tax environment. However,
they also ignored the implications for the Laffer curve. Our paper complements
this literature by focusing on how the conditional Laffer curve changes as debt or
transfers vary. A second strand has explored the Laffer effect in the context of
IM models. For example, Flode´n and Linde´ (2001) found that the Laffer curve
peaks when the labor income tax is approximatively 50% or higher. However, their
analysis abstracts from public debt. More recently, using an IM setup, Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2008) and Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson (2010) revisited the effects
of labor taxation studied by Prescott (2004). Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008) and
Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson (2010) compared the Laffer curves in IM and RA setups.
Focusing on labor income taxes, they found that the prohibitive part of the Laffer
curve in the IM case differs only mildly from that in the RA version of their model.
However, they too abstract from government debt. Finally, Holter et al. (2014)
characterize the impact of the progressivity of the labor tax code on the Laffer
curve. They find that progressive labor taxes significantly reduce tax revenues.
Guner et al. (2016) conclude that higher progressivity has limited effects on fiscal
revenues. Our paper complements these works by further investigating the shape
of the Laffer curve conditional on public debt.
6The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the
empirical evidence on negative debt. In Section 3, we expound the IM model, define
the steady-state equilibrium under study, and discuss our calibration strategy. We
formally introduce the concept of conditional Laffer curves. In Section 4, we discuss
our results. We also explore the robustness of our findings. The last section briefly
concludes.
2. Historical Evidence on Public Debt
As argued in the introduction, negative public debt plays a central role when
analyzing Laffer curves. It is thus important to show that the possibility of negative
public debt is empirically relevant. To this end, this section provides a historical
review of the public debt dynamics of the G7 countries, covering over a century for
some countries.
Here, we consider two definitions of public debt. Let bg denote the difference
between government liabilities and financial assets and kg denote non-financial
assets held by the government. One can simply measure public debt as bg or
alternatively as bg − kg.
We use the data on the government balance sheet (market value of liabilities, fi-
nancial assets, and non-financial assets) constructed by Piketty and Zucman (2014)
to obtain two measures of public debt.2 The first indicator corresponds to bg and
the second to bg − kg. These two measures are expressed as a fraction of national
income. The data are available at an annual frequency. The countries are Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States
2Using the recent international guidelines of the System of National Accounts (SNA) or the
European System of Accounts (ESA), Piketty and Zucman (2014) put together a new macro-
historical data set on wealth and income, including government wealth and its components. See
http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/PikettyZucman2013Book.pdf for an exhaustive exposition on the
data construction.
7(US). For France, Germany, the UK and the US, the sample covers more than one
century, whereas the sample starts between 1960 and 1970 for Canada, Italy and
Japan. The data for all countries end in 2010.
In the second definition, it is important to clarify the notion of non-financial as-
sets. These include non-produced assets (e.g., land, subsoil, water resources) and
produced assets: (i) tangibles, such as dwellings, other non-residential buildings
and structures, machinery and equipment, and weapon systems, and (ii) intan-
gibles, such as computer software, entertainment, literacy, and artistic originals.
Buildings and structures constitute, by far, the largest component of government
non-financial wealth and are mainly owned by regional and local governments. It
is important here to emphasize that this alternative definition of public debt is
somewhat contentious. This is so because the net return on non-financial assets
held by the government is assumed to be zero in the National Accounts. This limits
the direct comparison with the public debt concept in our model. However, this
alternative definition gives a useful assessment of government net wealth.
Figure 1 reports the first debt definitiong, bg. The figure shows that in all the
countries considered, large fluctuations in public debt are mainly associated with
major historical events. After having borrowed 40% of its national income to pay
for the Civil War, the US federal government reduced its debt by one-half in the
wake of World War I. Subsequently, the debt-to-national-income ratio fluctuated
around 40% until World War II. Between 1941 and 1945, the US lent Britain and
other countries money to help pay for military costs, and it spent a great deal on
its own military expenditures, leading to debt that exceeded one year of national
income. Following that war, the US economy grew, and the debt-to-income ratio
displayed a downward trend until the mid-1970s when it reached 30%. In the early
1980s, a large increase in defense spending and substantial tax cuts contributed
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to ballooning debt. Before the Great Recession, the ratio was below 50%, but the
resulting stimulus packages have led to an upward trend.
Similarly, in the 1990s, secular increases in Canadian government services and
entitlements pushed debt to 120% of national income. The Canadian government
decided to reduce its spending in an attempt to generate surpluses. From 1996 to
2007, the debt-to-income ratio was divided by more than two.
Since the 1970s, starting from a negative level, Japan’s net debt has increased
steadily. Over the the 1990s and 2000s, Japan experienced no increase in nomi-
nal income, so the debt-to-income ratio has continuously risen. Japan has been
unable to inflate its way out of debt, and it has made tiny interest payments to
bondholders.
Following the Napoleonic wars, the UK implemented a long and drastic austerity
plan such that the debt represented 26% of national income in 1913. At the end
of World War I, the ratio was 180% and remained virtually unchanged until the
beginning of World War II. The war caused a sharp increase in debt (reaching
270% in 1947). Unlike France, Germany, Italy and other continental countries, the
9UK refused to pursue inflationary default after either World War I or World War
II. This explains why the UK displayed only a very gradual decline over the next
three decades. From the early 1980s until 2008 (with the notable exception of 1990,
where debt was negative), the UK’s public debt hovered around 30%.
During the 19th century, France experienced rising deficits, and its debt reached
100% of national income by 1890. Most of this increase occurred after 1870 when
Germany imposed a costly indemnity on France as a result of the Franco-Prussian
War. Consequently, when World War I began, France’s debt exceeded 80% of
national income. Despite inflation during World War I, the debt-to-income ratio
rose to over 170% by the early 1920s. By the beginning of World War II, the ratio
had decreased to 100% but shot to over 160% in 1944. France then inflated its way
out of debt by imposing heavy losses on bondholders (the rate of inflation exceeded
50% per year between 1945 and 1948). The debt-to-income ratio decreased toward
zero until the end of the 1970s and has continually increased since.
Germany inflated its way out of its World War I debts through hyperinflation,
wiping out bondholder wealth. The rate of inflation was 17% per year, on average,
over the 1913-1950 period. In 1948, Germany used a currency conversion from
military marks to Deutsche marks to significantly reduce its debt obligations. Im-
portantly, German public debt was negative for roughly 30 years, from the early
1950’s to 1980.
Like France, Italy inflated its way out of debt after World War II. However, in
stark contrast with France, Italy consistently ran budget deficits after World War
II. In the mid-1990s, it reformed its public finances to prevent additional increases
in the debt-to-income ratio. During this period, Italy benefited from lower interest
rates.
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Figure 2. Public Debt - bg − kg
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Figure 2 reports bg − kg, which accounts for government non-financial assets.
Although substantial efforts have been undertaken to improve the measurement of
these assets, caution is warranted, especially with cross-country comparisons (e.g.,
statistical methodology, data coverage, sample period). The non-financial assets of
the sample countries share three important empirical features.
First, non-financial assets greatly exceed financial assets (by 2 to 5 times). Sec-
ond, in all countries (except Japan), ratios of non-financial assets to national income
exhibit remarkable stability. Consequently, the second indicator is roughly a down-
ward shift of the first indicator. Third, non-financial assets are of the same order
of magnitude as government liabilities. It follows that bg−kg can be either positive
or negative depending on the period. For most countries, regimes of positive debts
have been followed by long periods of negative debts (see, for instance, France and
the UK).
The period 1950-1980 is especially striking, as it displays large negative debt-
to-national-income ratios (see France, Germany and the US) due to large public
assets and low debt levels. The ratios were between -50% and -100% in the early
11
1980s for France, Germany, the UK and the US. However, the ratios increased
during the 1990-2000 period and were close to zero in 2010 (due to large increases
in government liabilities). Canada displays another interesting pattern: The gov-
ernment debt-to-income ratio was 60% in 1996, subsequently returning to zero in
just 15 years when inflation was stable around 2%.
This historical evidence suggests that periods of negative debt (as a fraction of
national income) are neither curiosities nor exceptional episodes.
3. Model
3.1. The Economic Environment. We consider a discrete time economy with-
out aggregate risk similar to that studied in Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998). Time
is indexed by t ∈ N. The final good Yt, which is the numeraire, is produced by
competitive firms, according to the technology
Yt = K
θ
t (ZtNt)
1−θ,
where θ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the elasticity of production with respect to capital; Kt
and Nt are the inputs of capital and efficient labor, respectively; and Zt is an
exogenous technical progress index evolving according to Zt+1 = (1 + γ)Zt, with
γ > 0 and Z0 = 1. Firms rent capital and efficient labor on competitive markets
at rates rt + δ and wt, respectively. Here, δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the depreciation rate
of physical capital, rt is the interest rate, and wt is the wage rate.
The first-order conditions for profit maximization are
rt + δ = θ
(
Kt
ZtNt
)θ−1
,
wt = (1− θ)Zt
(
Kt
ZtNt
)θ
.
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The economy is populated by a continuum of ex ante identical, infinitely lived
households. The typical household utility is given by
E
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
1
1− σ
(
ct
Zt
)1−σ
− η
1 + χ
h1+χt
]
|a0, s0
}
,
where E0{·|a0, s0} is the mathematical expectation conditioned on the individual
state at date 0. The individual state consists of initial assets a0 and the exogenous
individual state s0. Here, β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the discount factor, ct ≥ 0 is individual
consumption, 0 ≤ ht ≤ 1 is the individual labor supply, σ > 0 is the relative risk
aversion coefficient, χ > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor, and η > 0
is a scaling constant. Consumption appears in deviation from the index of technical
progress to ensure a well-behaved, balanced-growth path. This non-standard form
is useful whenever σ 6= 1. In the robustness section, we explore the sensitivity of
our results to the limiting case σ = 1, which we interpret as logarithmic utility.
In this particular case, our normalization does not play any role and utility is
balanced-growth-path consistent.3
At the beginning of each period, households receive an individual productivity
level st > 0. We assume that st is i.i.d. across agents and evolves over time
according to a Markov process, with bounded support S and stationary transition
function Q(s, s′).4
An individual agent’s efficient labor is stht, with corresponding labor earnings
given by (1−τN )wtstht, where τN denotes the labor income tax. In addition, agents
3This specification yields equivalent results to one in which utility would be a function of the
non-normalized level of consumption and Z1−σt would appear as a scaling factor in front of labor
disutility. Benhabib and Farmer (2000) argue that this specification is a reduced-form for technical
progress in home production.
4The transition Q has the following interpretation: for all s ∈ S and for all S0 ∈ S , where S
denotes the Borel subsets of S, Q(s,S0) is the probability that next period’s individual state lies
in S0 when current state is s.
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self-insure by accumulating at units of assets that pay an after-tax rate of return
(1 − τA)rt, where τA denotes the capital income tax. These assets can consist of
units of physical capital and/or government bonds. Once arbitrage opportunities
have been ruled out, each asset has the same rate of return. Agents must also pay
a consumption tax τC . Finally, they perceive transfers Tt. Thus, an agent’s budget
constraint is
(1 + τC)ct + at+1 ≤ (1− τN )wtstht + [1 + (1− τA)rt]at + Tt.
Borrowing is exogenously restricted by the constraint
at+1 ≥ 0.
Finally, there is a government in the economy. The government issues debt
Bt+1, collects tax revenues, provides rebates and transfers, and consumes Gt units
of final goods. The associated budget constraint is given by
Bt+1 = (1 + rt)Bt + Tt +Gt − (τArtAt + τNwtNt + τCCt),
where Ct and At denote aggregate (per capita) consumption and assets held by the
agents, respectively.
3.2. Equilibrium Defined. In the remainder of this paper, we focus exclusively
on the steady state of an appropriately normalized version of the above economy.
Growing variables are rendered stationary by dividing them by Zt. Variables so
normalized are indicated with a hat. The ratio of government expenditures to
output g ≡ G/Y is assumed constant. It is convenient at this stage to define
b ≡ B/Y and τ ≡ T/Y .
We let A denote the set of possible values for assets aˆ. We let the joint distribu-
tion of agents across assets aˆ and individual exogenous states s be denoted x(aˆ, s)
14
defined on A ×S , the Borel subsets of A × S. Thus, for all A0 × S0 ∈ A ×S ,
x(A0,S0) is the mass of agents with assets aˆ in A0 and individual state s in S0.
We can now write an agent’s problem in recursive form
v(aˆ, s) = max
cˆ,h,aˆ′
{
1
1− σ cˆ
1−σ − η
1 + χ
h1+χ + β
∫
S
v(aˆ′, s′)Q(s, ds′)
}
s.t. (1 + τC)cˆ+ (1 + γ)aˆ
′ ≤ (1− τN )wˆsh+ (1 + (1− τA)r)aˆ+ Tˆ ,
aˆ′ ≥ 0, cˆ ≥ 0, 0 ≤ h ≤ 1.
(1)
For convenience, we restrict aˆ to the compact set A = [0, aˆM ], where aˆM is
a large number.5 We can thus define a stationary, recursive equilibrium in the
following way.
Definition 1. A steady-state equilibrium is a constant system of prices {r, wˆ}, a
vector of constant policy variables (τC , τA, τN , Tˆ , Gˆ, Bˆ), a value function v(aˆ, s),
time-invariant decision rules for an individual’s assets holdings, consumption, and
labor supply {ga(aˆ, s), gc(aˆ, s), gh(aˆ, s}, a measure x(aˆ, s) of agents over the state
space A×S, aggregate quantities Aˆ ≡ ∫ aˆdx, Cˆ ≡ ∫ gc(aˆ, s)dx, N ≡ ∫ sgh(aˆ, s)dx,
and Kˆ such that:
(i) The value function v(aˆ, s) solves the agent’s problem stated in equation (1),
with associated decision rules ga(aˆ, s), gc(aˆ, s) and gh(aˆ, s);
(ii) Firms maximize profits and factor markets clear so that
wˆ = (1− θ)
(
Kˆ
N
)θ
,
r + δ = θ
(
Kˆ
N
)θ−1
;
5aˆM is selected so that the decision rule on assets for an individual with the highest productivity
and highest discount factor crosses the 45-degree line below aˆM .
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(iii) Tax revenues equal government expenses
τN wˆN + τArAˆ+ τCCˆ = Tˆ + Gˆ+ (r − γ)Bˆ;
(iv) Aggregate savings equal firm demand for capital plus government debt
Aˆ = Kˆ + Bˆ;
(v) The distribution x is invariant
x(A0,S0) =
∫
A0×S0
{∫
A×S
1{aˆ′=ga(aˆ,s)}Q(s, s
′)dx
}
da′ds′,
for all A0 × S0 ∈ A ×S , where 1{·} is an indicator function taking value
one if the statement is true and zero otherwise.
For comparison purposes, we also consider a version of the model in which (i)
we impose idiosyncratic labor income shocks st set to their average value, and
(ii) we relax the borrowing constraint. We refer to this environment as the RA
environment. Notice that in this RA setup, the distinction between effective labor
H ≡ ∫ gh(aˆ, s)dx and efficient labor N is no longer useful, since the quantities
coincide (up to a multiplicative constant). We thus incorporate a productivity
scale factor Ω in front of Nt in the production function to compensate the RA
economy for the average labor productivity effect present in the IM economy (i.e.,
the relative difference between N and H). By doing so, we ensure that in the
benchmark calibration described below, all economies share the same interest rate,
effective labor H, and stationary production level Yˆ .
3.3. The Laffer Curves. From the government budget constraint, fiscal revenues
(in deviation from Zt) Rˆ are given by
Rˆ = τN wˆN + τArKˆ + τCCˆ.
16
Notice that the level of fiscal revenues R is defined net of fiscal receipts from taxing
returns to public bonds.
Traditionally, the steady-state Laffer curve associated with τi, i ∈ {N,A,C} is
defined as follows. Let τi vary over an admissible range, holding the other two taxes
constant. The Laffer curve is then the locus (τi, Rˆ), which relates the level of fiscal
revenues Rˆ to the tax rates τi. This definition of the Laffer curve correctly takes
into account the general equilibrium effects induced by a tax change, as argued by
Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). For example, a given change in τN will modify x, ga,
gh, and gc such that it will also impact all the fiscal bases.
However, notice that in this definition, no reference is made to how the gov-
ernment balances its budget constraint when τi varies. Indeed, in equilibrium, we
must always have
R
Y
= g + τ + [(1− τA)r − γ]b,
so that a given change in one of the three tax rates is associated with a correspond-
ing adjustment in either τ or b.6
In an RA setup, one can abstract safely from these adjustments, as shown in
the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In a RA setup, the steady-state Laffer curve associated with τi,
i ∈ {N,A,C} is invariant to which of τ or b is adjusted to balance the government
budget constraint.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
This proposition establishes that in an RA setup, given a change in one of
the three distorting taxes, adjusting lump-sum transfers or public debt is of no
consequence for the equilibrium allocation and price system, thus implying the
6Recall that g is constant in all our experiments.
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same Laffer curve. This is just Ricardian equivalence at play, which in the present
context, manifests itself notably through the invariance of the after-tax interest
rate to changes in τ or b.
In an IM setup, however, the invariance of the after-tax interest rate does not
hold. Indeed, the after-tax interest rate is affected by the fact that capital and gov-
ernment bonds provide partial insurance to households. The cost of this insurance
is reflected in the lower rate of return on those assets. When the government issues
more debt, it effectively decreases the price of capital, thus lowering the insurance
cost associated with holding capital. This translates into an increasing interest
rate. By the same line of reasoning, since an increase in transfers also provides
partial insurance to households, it also translates into an increasing interest rate.
Hence, it is a priori unclear how balancing the government budget constraint via
either τ or b affects the Laffer curve. As a consequence, in an IM setup, there is no
sense in which on can define a Laffer curve independently from the way in which
the government budget constraint is balanced.
In order to organize our discussion, it is thus convenient at this stage to define
the concept of a steady-state conditional Laffer curve as follows.
Definition 2. Let b be fixed, and let τ vary over an admissible range. Let τi(τ),
i ∈ {N,A,C}, denote the tax rate that balances the government budget constraint,
holding the other two taxes constant, and let Rˆ(τ) denote the associated level of
government revenues. The steady-state Laffer curve conditional on transfers is the
locus (τi(τ), Rˆ(τ)) relating tax rates to fiscal revenues. One can alternatively define
the steady-state Laffer curve conditional on debt as the locus (τi(b), Rˆ(b)) by varying
b over an admissible range, holding τ constant.
Definition 2 leads us to the following proposition.
18
Proposition 2. In an RA setup, the steady-state conditional Laffer curves (τi(τ), Rˆ(τ))
and (τi(b), Rˆ(b) coincide, for all i ∈ {N,A,C}.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
This proposition establishes that in an RA setup, the notion of conditional
Laffer curves serves no special purpose, since the curves coincide. In the rest of
this paper, we focus on analyzing the extent to which they differ in an IM setup.
3.4. Calibration and Solution Method. The model is calibrated to the US
economy. A period is taken to be a year. Preferences are described by four pa-
rameters, σ, χ, η and β. We set σ = 1.5, as is conventional in the literature, and
consider two alternative values for χ. In our benchmark calibration, we set χ = 1,
yielding a Frisch elasticity of labor supply equal to 1. Alternatively, we consider
χ = 2, yielding a Frisch elasticity of labor supply equal to 0.5. Both values are
common in the macroeconomic literature. In each case, we pin down η so that ag-
gregate hours worked H ≡ ∫ gh(a, s)dx equal 0.25. The subjective discount factor
β is adjusted so that the after-tax interest rate is equal to 4%, as in Trabandt and
Uhlig (2011).
The fiscal parameters b and g are set to match the debt-output ratio and the
government consumption-output ratio reported by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), i.e.,
b = 0.63 and g = 0.18, respectively. The tax rates are calibrated to match estimates
of effective tax rates computed using the methodology developed by Mendoza et al.
(1994). This yields τN = 0.28, τA = 0.38, and τC = 0.05. Using these parameters,
the benchmark value of the transfer-output ratio τ is endogenously computed to
balance the government budget constraint, yielding τ = 7.4%. Alternatively, we
consider an economy with g set at a much smaller value. See the robustness section
for more details.
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We assume that log(st) follows an AR(1) process
log(st) = ρs log(st−1) + σst, t ∼ N(0, 1).
We interpret log(st) as the residual persistent and idiosyncratic part of the log-wage
rate in the specification adopted by Kaplan (2012), once experience and individual
fixed effects have been accounted for. In the latter paper, the estimation results
based on year effects yield ρs = 0.958 and σs =
√
0.017. We approximate this
AR(1) process via the Rouwenhorst (1995) method, as advocated by Kopecky and
Suen (2010), using ns = 7 points. This yields a transition matrix p˜i and a discrete
support for individual productivity levels {s1, . . . , sns}.
In the spirit of Kindermann and Krueger (2014), we then allow for an eighth
state corresponding to very high labor productivity. As they argue, such a state
is a reduced form for entrepreneurial or artistic opportunities yielding very high
labor income.
The final transition matrix is then
pi =

p˜i11(1− p8) · · · p˜i14(1− p8) · · · p˜ii17(1− p8) p8
...
...
...
...
p˜i71(1− p8) · · · p˜i74(1− p8) · · · p˜i77(1− p8) p8
0 · · · 1− p88 · · · 0 p88

.
Here, p8 is the probability of reaching the eighth productivity state from any normal
productivity level. Additionally, p88 is the probability of staying in the high labor
income state conditional on being in this state.
This specification of labor income shocks gives us three parameters (p8, p88, s8),
which we adjust to match, as closely as possible, the Gini coefficient of the wealth
distribution (Gw = 0.82), the share of wealth held by the richest 20% (a¯5 = 0.83),
and the Gini coefficient of the labor earning distribution (Ge = 0.64), as reported
by Dı´az-Gı´menez et al. (2011). The calibration is summarized in Table I. In the
2
0Table I. Parameters and Calibration Targets
Common Parameters
γ = 0.02, θ = 0.38, δ = 0.07, τN = 0.28, τA = 0.36, τC = 0.05
Specific Parameters
Benchmark Low g High χ Low b Log Utility Alternative s
χ = 1, b = 0.63,
g = 0.18, σ = 1.50
χ = 1, b = 0.63,
g = 0.05, σ = 1.50
χ = 2, b = 0.63,
g = 0.18, σ = 1.50
χ = 1, b = −0.50,
g = 0.18, σ = 1.50
χ = 1, b = 0.63,
g = 0.18, σ = 1.00
χ = 1, b = 0.63,
g = 0.18, σ = 1.50
β 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.94
η 13.00 8.00 47.00 12.00 9.00 13.00
p8 1.20% 1.25% 1.20% 1.80% 1.25% –
p88 85% 85% 85% 74% 85% –
s8/s7 4.40 3.60 5.30 4.40 3.40 –
Calibration Targets
(1− τA)r 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.08
H 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.30
Ge 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.27
Gw 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.63
a¯5 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.63
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robustness section, we explore the sensitivity of our results to an alternative cali-
bration in which the process for s does not have the extra productivity level and
boils down to the AR(1) specification of Kaplan (2012).
The solution method is now briefly described.7 Given the calibration targets
for the debt-output ratio and the tax rates, we postulate candidate values for the
interest rate r and aggregate efficient labor N . We then solve the government
budget constraint for the transfer-output ratio. To do so, we use the representative
firm’s first-order conditions, which give us values for Kˆ and wˆ, and the aggregate
resource constraint, from which we determine Cˆ. Given these values, we solve the
agent’s problem using the endogenous grid method proposed by Carroll (2006) and
adapted to deal with the endogenous labor supply in the spirit of Barillas and
Fernandez-Villaverde (2007). Using the implied decision rules, we then solve for
the stationary distribution, as in R´ıos-Rull (1999), and use it to compute aggregate
quantities. We then iterate on r and N and repeat the whole process until the
markets for capital and labor clear. For a given N , the interest rate is updated via
a hybrid bisection-secant method. The bisection part of the algorithm is activated
whenever the secant would update r to a value higher than the RA interest rate
(which would result in diverging private savings, as shown in Aiyagari, 1994). Once
the market-clearing r is found, N is updated with a standard secant method.8
To compute the conditional Laffer curves, we adapt the previous algorithm as
follows. We first vary either the transfer-output ratio or the debt-output ratio
over pre-specified ranges. At each grid point, given the postulated pair (r,N),
the government steady-state budget constraint is balanced by adjusting one of the
7Further details are reported in the Technical Appendix.
8In a Aiyagari (1994)-like model with an endogenous labor supply, the outer loop on N would
not be necessary. In our setup, because we also need to balance the government budget constraint,
this extra loop is needed. See the Technical Appendix for further details.
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three tax rates considered, holding the other two constant. Given values for the
debt-output ratio or the transfer-output ratio, we then solve for the agent’s decision
rules and for the stationary distribution. We then iterate on r and N as described
above.
4. Results
4.1. Labor Income Taxes. Figure 3 describes how the conditional Laffer curve
associated with labor income taxes τN is constructed when the transfer-output ratio
τ = T/Y is varied. Panel A (top left graph) shows the relation between the level
of fiscal revenues Rˆ(τ) and τ . Panel B (top right graph) shows the corresponding
relation between τN (τ) and τ . Finally, panel C (bottom graph) is a combination
of the previous two relations. The black dotted line corresponds to the IM setup,
and the dashed gray line is associated with the RA economy.
In both IM and RA economies, the Laffer curve conditional on τ has the classic
inverted-U shape, as displayed in panel C. To understand this shape, consider a
simplified setup in which τA = τC = 0. In this configuration, the government
budget constraint simplifies to
R
Y
= (1− θ)τN (τ) = g + τ + (r − γ)b.
Since g and b are held constant, assuming differentiability, we obtain from the
above equation
∂
(
R
Y
)
∂τ
= (1− θ)∂τN
∂τ
= 1 +
∂r
∂τ
b.
In the RA economy, since ∂r/∂τ = 0 (see the proof of proposition 1), fiscal revenues
as a share of GDP R/Y unambiguously increase when τ increases. As the above
equation shows, this also implies that labor income taxes increase with τ . Thus,
output declines when taxes rise.9 The level of fiscal revenues Rˆ is the product of
9One can show that this happens whenever consumption and leisure are normal goods.
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Figure 3. Construction of the Laffer Curve Conditional on Trans-
fers - Labor Income Taxes
Note: The black dotted line corresponds to the IM economy, and the dashed gray curve is associated with
the RA economy.
a term that declines with τ and another that is an increasing function of τ . This
yields the inverted-U shape obtained for Rˆ(τ) in the RA setup.
In the IM setup, changes in transfers impact the steady-state interest rate.
This is so because higher transfers reduce the self-insurance motive and thus reduce
capital accumulation by private agents. We thus expect ∂r/∂τ to be positive. Since
b is positive in our benchmark calibration, we obtain that R/Y increases with τ .
For the same insurance motive, higher transfers also reduce the aggregate labor
supply and the capital stock. This is reinforced by the fact that higher transfers
come hand in hand with higher labor taxation. Since both N and Kˆ decline,
aggregate output Yˆ also declines.
Since in both setups, τN is an increasing function of τ (see panel B), the locus
(τN (τ), Rˆ(τ)) inherits the inverted-U shape obtained for (τ, Rˆ(τ)), thus yielding a
classic Laffer curve. In the general case, when τC and τA are non-zero, the above
reasoning holds but must also take into account the responses of Kˆ and Cˆ to
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Figure 4. Aggregate Variables - Laffer curve on τN Conditional on τ
Note: The black dotted line corresponds to the benchmark IM setup for the Laffer curve on τN conditional
on τ (thus holding b constant). The dashed grey line corresponds to the RA economy.
changes in τ . These endogenous responses combine to define the curves reported
in Figure 3.
Notice that the conditional Laffer curve in the IM setup clearly resembles its
RA counterpart. If anything, the only difference is that the right-hand side of the
Laffer curve in this case declines at a slower pace than its RA counterpart. When
transfers are adjusted, resorting to an RA model or to an IM model to characterize
the shape and peak of the labor income tax Laffer curve has only mild consequences.
Figure 4 reports key aggregate variables that are useful for understanding the
underpinnings of the Laffer curve conditional on transfers. In the RA setup, as
previously explained, the after-tax interest rate is invariant to changes in transfers.
This, in turn, implies that the capital-labor ratio is fixed. In this setup, an increase
in transfers essentially boils down to an increase in the labor income tax, which
translates into lower equilibrium hours worked and, thus, output. In contrast, in
an IM economy, the interest rate increases as transfer increase. This is the mere
reflection of lower precautionary savings. This translates into an even lower capital
25
stock than in the RA setup for sufficiently large transfers. The increase in labor
income tax then lowers employment, which also results in lower output.
We turn now to the Laffer curve for labor income taxes τN conditional on the
debt-output ratio b. Figure 5 describes how this curve is constructed. Panel A (top
left graph) shows the relation between Rˆ(b) and b. Panel B (top right graph) shows
the corresponding relation between τN (b) and b. Finally, panel C (bottom graph)
is a combination of the previous two relations. The plain black line corresponds to
the IM setup and the dashed gray line is associated with the RA economy.
When debt is varied, the conditional Laffer curve now looks like a oriented
horizontally S. In the left part of the graph, for relatively low tax levels, the Laffer
curve has an increasing branch, which reaches the usual pattern as labor income
taxes decrease. This junction takes place at what appears to be a minimum tax
level that is close to 25%. Interestingly, the minimum labor income tax obtains
for a debt-output ratio close to −96%. Above this level, there can be one, two, or
three tax rates associated with a given level of fiscal revenues. That is, there can
be two levels of fiscal revenues associated with the same tax rate on the odd part
of the Laffer curve conditional on debt: A high (low) level associated with negative
(positive) debt.
What explains the odd shape of the Laffer curve in the left part of Figure 5
when the debt-output ratio is varied? To gain insight into this question, imagine
again a simplified setting in which τC = τA = 0. Assuming differentiability of fiscal
revenues with respect to b, one obtains
∂
(
R
Y
)
∂b
= (1− θ)∂τN
∂b
= (r − γ) + b∂r
∂b
.
Now, since public debt crowds out capital in the household’s portfolio, we expect
∂r/∂b > 0. Indeed, as shown by Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), when b is large,
Kˆ decreases, which increases the equilibrium interest rate r. Conversely, when b is
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Figure 5. Construction of the Laffer Curve Conditional on Debt -
Labor Income Taxes
Note: The black line corresponds to the incomplete-market economy, and the dashed gray curve is asso-
ciated with the RA economy.
negative and large in absolute value, private wealth Aˆ shrinks, and the aggregate
level of capital Kˆ increases, which decreases the equilibrium interest rate.
Thus, the term b∂r/∂b changes sign when b changes sign. For a sufficiently
negative debt-output ratio, we can thus observe a change in the sign of ∂(R/Y )/∂b
and, since R/Y = (1− θ)τN , a corresponding change in the sign of ∂τN/∂b.
At the same time, as shown in Figure 6, Kˆ and N decrease with Bˆ, so Yˆ is
also decreasing with Bˆ. Thus, the level of fiscal revenues R(Bˆ) is obtained as the
product of a relation that changes sign and another that is strictly decreasing,
thus yielding a horizontal S shape (see panel A). Now, given the non-monotonic
response of τN (Bˆ) (see panel B), the Laffer curve conditional on debt, which is a
combination of panels A and B, also exhibits a horizontal S shape (panel C).10
10It is important at this stage to emphasize that the odd shape of the Laffer curve conditional
on debt has nothing to do with pathological behavior of the labor supply. In particular, the
Technical Appendix reports that efficient hours are a decreasing function of Bˆ that closely mimic
the behavior of hours worked in an RA setup.
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Figure 6. Aggregate Variables - Laffer curve on τN conditional on b
Note: The black line corresponds to the benchmark IM setup for the Laffer curve on τN conditional on b
(thus holding τ constant). The dashed grey line corresponds to the RA economy.
Starting from a negative debt-output ratio Bˆ, output, τN , and R are large. As
the government sells more and more assets, i.e., as Bˆ increases, output and τN
decline, so R also declines. This corresponds to the odd part of the Laffer curve.
In this region, there are two forces at play. First, as Bˆ increases, the capital stock
decreases, thus implying declining real wages and resulting in declining aggregate
labor N . Second, since τN also decreases, agents are willing to supply more labor.
It turns out that the first force dominates. Once the minimal tax is reached, τN
and Rˆ start to increase while Yˆ is still declining. This corresponds to the regular
part of the Laffer curve, i.e., the part that looks like an inverted U . In this region,
increases in τN dominate the disincentives of taxation up to the maximal tax rate
after which the disincentives start to dominate.
In the general case, when τC and τA are non-zero, the above reasoning holds but
must also take into account the responses of Kˆ and Cˆ. These endogenous responses
combine to define the point at which fiscal revenues exhibit the odd shape identified
above. This also defines the minimal labor income tax.
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Figure 6 reports key aggregate variables that are useful for understanding the
underpinnings of the Laffer curve conditional on debt. The results for the RA
model are exactly the same as in Figure 4. In the IM setup, things are radically
modified. The interest rate increases steeply as the debt-output ratio increases.
This is the crowding-out effect emphasized by Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998).
This translates into a steep decline in capital as well. Labor, in turn, is the mirror
image of the tax rate. In particular, as public debt becomes increasingly negative,
labor starts to decline precisely when taxes start to increase.
4.2. Capital Income Taxes. Figure 7 reports three Laffer curves associated with
variations in τA. The dashed gray curve corresponds to the RA economy. The black
dotted line is the Laffer curve conditional on transfers Tˆ in the IM setup. Finally,
the black line is the Laffer curve conditional on debt Bˆ in the IM economy. To save
space, we dispense with a complete description of how the conditional Laffer curves
are constructed, as the process closely parallels the previously explained steps.
In the case when transfers are varied, the conditional Laffer curve associated
with τA has the standard inverted-U shape. It has the overall same shape as the
curve that would obtain in the RA economy, as shown in Figure 7.11
As was the case for labor income taxes, when the debt-output ratio Bˆ is varied,
we reach very different conclusions (see the black curve in Figure 7). Under this
assumption, the Laffer curve also looks like a horizontally oriented S. In the left
part of the graph, for relatively low tax levels, the Laffer curve has an increasing
branch that follows the regular pattern as capital income taxes decrease. Once
again, this junction takes place at what appears to be a minimum tax level close
to 25%. Interestingly, the minimum capital income tax obtains for a debt-output
11The figures reporting how key aggregate variables vary with τ and b are reported in Appendix
C.
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Figure 7. Laffer Curves – Capital Income Tax
Note: Level of fiscal revenues as a function of labor income tax τA. The black dotted line corresponds to
the Laffer curve conditional on transfers, the plain balck line is associated with the Laffer curve conditional
on debt, and the dashed grey line corresponds to the RA economy.
ratio close to −129%. Above this level, there can be one, two, or three tax rates
associated with a given level of fiscal revenues.
4.3. Consumption Taxes. Figure 8 reports three Laffer curves associated with
variations in τC , defined in the exact way as before. The dashed gray line corre-
sponds to the RA economy as above. The black dotted line is the Laffer curve
associated with the IM economy conditional on transfers Tˆ . Finally, the black line
is the Laffer curve in the IM economy conditional on the debt-output ratio Bˆ.12
As in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), the Laffer curve associated with τC does not
exhibit a peak in either the RA setup or the IM setup with adjusted transfers. In
the latter, fiscal revenues are slightly higher than in the former. Fundamentally, in
both settings, taxing consumption is like taxing labor (both taxes appear similarly
in the first-order condition governing labor supply). A difference, though, is that
12The figures reporting how key aggregate variables vary with τ and b are reported in Appendix
C.
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Figure 8. Laffer Curves – Consumption Tax
Note: Level of fiscal revenues as a function of labor income tax τA. The black dotted line corresponds to
the Laffer curve conditional on transfers, the plain black line is associated with the Laffer curve conditional
on debt, and the dashed grey line corresponds to the RA economy.
in an IM economy such as ours, agents with low labor productivity choose not to
work whenever they hold enough assets. Clearly, those agents would not suffer
from labor income taxation but do suffer from consumption taxes. Combined with
the relative inelasticity of the labor supply in the IM setup, this explains why the
government can raise more revenues in this framework than in the RA setup.
As in the previous sections, when the debt-output ratio Bˆ is varied, we reach
different conclusions (see the black curve in Figure 8). Under this assumption, in
the left part of the graph, for relatively low tax levels, the Laffer curve has an
increasing branch that follows the regular pattern as consumption taxes decrease.
Again, this junction takes place at what appears to be a minimum tax level that
is close to 1.42%, which is associated with a debt-output ratio close to −110.8%.
Above this level, there can be two tax rates associated with a given level of fiscal
revenues.
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Figure 9. Laffer Curves Conditional on τ for Alternative b
Note: Laffer curves conditional on transfers for alternative levels of the steady-state debt-output ratio.
4.4. Corollary. Proposition 1 establishes that the Laffer curves associated with τi,
i ∈ {N,A,C} do not depend on the debt-output ratio in a RA setup. That is, the
Laffer curves in an economy with a debt-output ratio of 63% are the same as those
in an economy with a debt-output ratio of −50%. However, the previous analyses
suggest that we should not expect this property to hold in an IM framework due
to the general equilibrium feedback effect of public debt on the after-tax interest
rate. This section investigates how variations in the steady-state debt-output ratio
impact the Laffer curve conditional on transfers.
The results are reported in Figure 9. Panels A, B, and C report the Laffer curves
associated with labor income taxes, capital income taxes, and consumption taxes,
respectively. For each tax considered in the analysis, three Laffer curves (condi-
tional on transfers) are drawn. The plain black lines correspond to the benchmark
calibration in which b = 0.63. The black dashed lines correspond to an alterna-
tive economy with b = −0.5, holding all the other parameters to their benchmark
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value. As before, the dashed grey lines correspond to the Laffer curves under the
RA model, which we report to facilitate comparison.
Several interesting results emerge. First, panels A and C show that for the range
of the debt-output ratios considered here, the Laffer curves associated with labor
income taxes τN and the consumption taxes τC hardly differ. To some extent, this is
reassuring given the current fiscal context in the US. However, panels A and C also
show that for negative debt levels, the Laffer curves on τN and τC are somewhat
higher than their benchmark counterparts. More striking differences emerge from
panel B, which shows the Laffer curves associated with capital income taxation.
4.5. Robustness. In our robustness assessment, we explore five alternative cali-
brations. The first considers a lower elasticity of labor supply (χ = 2), since the
Laffer curve has been found to be very sensitive to this parameter (see Trabandt
and Uhlig, 2011). The second considers a lower share of government spending.
Here, we set g to a smaller number, 5%, adjusting τ to a larger value. As ar-
gued by Oh and Reis (2012) and Prescott (2004), a significant share of government
spending can be thought as transfers. Also, as argued in Section 2, public debt
(net of financial assets) is negative, on average, over the last century in the US,
with a value of approximately -50%. In our third robustness check, we recalibrate
the government debt-output ratio to match this number. In our fourth robustness
check, we explore the sensitivity of the oddly-shaped Laffer curves to the log-utility
case (σ = 1 in the utility function). Finally, in our last robustness check, we drop
the exceptional productivity level and adopt the process for idiosyncratic labor
productivity estimated by Kaplan (2012).
In each robustness analysis, except for the last one, we recalibrate the model to
match the calibration targets as in the benchmark case. The calibration details are
reported in Table I. The results are reported in Figures 10 (lower Frisch elasticity),
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Figure 10. Laffer Curves - Lower Elasticity of Labor Supply
Note: The black dotted line is associated with the Laffer curve conditional on transfers, the plain black
line is associated with the Laffer curve conditional on debt, and the dashed grey line corresponds to the
RA Laffer curve.
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Figure 11. Laffer Curves - Lower Share of Government Spending
Note: The black dotted line is associated with the Laffer curve conditional on transfers, the plain black
line is associated with the Laffer curve conditional on debt, and the dashed grey line corresponds to the
RA Laffer curve.
11 (lower share of government spending), 12 (negative debt-output ratio), 13 (log-
utility), and 14 (alternative process for s).
The bottom line is that in all our robustness analyses, our qualitative results
hold. In particular, in each alternative calibration, we find that in an IM economy,
the Laffer curves conditional on debt look like a horizontal S for labor income
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Figure 12. Laffer Curves - Negative Debt-Output Ratio
Note: The black dotted line is associated with the Laffer curve conditional on transfers, the plain black
line is associated with the Laffer curve conditional on debt, and the dashed grey line corresponds to the
RA Laffer curve.
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Figure 13. Laffer Curves - Log Utility
Note: The black dotted line is associated with the Laffer curve conditional on transfers, the plain black
line is associated with the Laffer curve conditional on debt, and the dashed grey line corresponds to the
RA Laffer curve.
and capital income taxes, while the Laffer curves conditional on transfers resemble
their RA analogs. Notice that an odd shape appears even for the Laffer curve on
consumption taxes conditional on debt.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have inspected how allowing for liquidity-constrained agents
and incomplete financial markets impacts the shape of the Laffer curve. To address
this question, we formulated a neoclassical growth model along the lines of Aiyagari
and McGrattan (1998). The model was calibrated to the US economy to mimic
great ratios as well as moments related to the wealth and earnings distributions.
We paid particular attention to which of debt or transfers are adjusted to balance
the government budget constraint as taxes are varied. In a RA framework, this
does not matter, whereas opting to adjust debt rather than transfers is important
in an IM setup.
Our main findings are the following. The properties of the Laffer curve depend
on whether it is conditional on debt or conditional on transfers. When we consider
Laffer curves conditional on transfers, the results in an IM economy closely resemble
their RA analogs. However, when we consider Laffer curves conditional on debt,
we obtain a dramatically different picture. Now, the Laffer curves on labor and
36
capital income taxes resemble horizontal Ss, meaning that there can be up to three
tax rates associated with the same level of fiscal revenues. These properties appear
robust to a series of alternative specifications/calibrations.
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Appendix A. Proof of proposition 1
Recall that we defined
τ ≡ Tˆ
Yˆ
, b ≡ Bˆ
Yˆ
.
In the representative agent version of the model, the steady-state system is
Cˆ + (γ + δ)Kˆ = (1− g)Yˆ , (A.1)
(1 + τC)Λˆ = Cˆ
−σ, (A.2)
Λˆ(1− τN )wˆ = ηHχ, (A.3)
Yˆ = Kˆθ(ΩH)1−θ, (A.4)
r + δ = θ
Yˆ
Kˆ
, (A.5)
wˆ = (1− θ) Yˆ
H
, (A.6)
1 + γ = β[1 + (1− τA)r]. (A.7)
The system is solved recursively in the usual manner. Combining (A.7) and (A.5),
one arrives at
Yˆ
Kˆ
=
1 + γ − β[1− (1− τA)δ]
β(1− τA)θ .
Using (A.4), this implies
Kˆ
H
=
(
Yˆ
Kˆ
) 1
θ−1
Ω
and
Yˆ
H
=
(
Yˆ
Kˆ
) θ
θ−1
Ω.
Using (A.1), this implies that
Cˆ
H
= (1− g) Yˆ
H
− (γ + δ)Kˆ
H
.
Then, combining (A.2), (A.3), and (A.6), one arrives at
1− θ
η
1− τN
1 + τC
Yˆ
H
Cˆ−σ = Hχ,
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and rearranging yields
H =
(
1− θ
η
1− τN
1 + τC
Yˆ
H
(
Cˆ
H
)−σ) 1χ+σ
.
Having solved for H, we can solve for all the other variables. It thus turns out that
the steady-state allocation (Cˆ, Kˆ,H, Yˆ ) and the steady-state price system (r, wˆ)
do not depend on either τ or b. Tax revenues Rˆ, in turn, depend only on the tax
system (τN , τA, τC), the steady-state allocation and the steady-state price system.
Thus, for i ∈ {N,A,C}, the Laffer curve associated with τi is independent of either
τ or b.
As an aside, we noted that in practice, we recalibrate η and β so that the
RA model and the benchmark IM model have the same H and r given otherwise
identical structural parameters (i.e., θ, δ, γ, σ, χ) and identical fiscal parameters
(i.e., b, τ , τA, τN , τC). Hence, given a value of r, we back out β via (A.7), yielding
β =
1 + γ
1 + (1− τA)r .
Similarly, given r and H, we back out η using
η =
1− θ
Hχ+σ
1− τN
1 + τC
Yˆ
H
(
Cˆ
H
)−σ
using the formulas for Yˆ /H and Cˆ/H obtained above.
Appendix B. Proof of proposition 2
Given proposition 1, it is sufficient to establish the existence of a one-to-one
relationship between τ and τi and between b and τi, i ∈ {N,A,C}, to prove that
the two conditional Laffer curves (τi(τ), R(τ)) and (τi(b), R(b)) coincide in the RA
setup.
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To this end, let r˜ ≡ (1− τA)r denote the after-tax interest rate. We thus have
r˜ =
1 + γ
β
− 1.
Notice that in the RA model, the steady-state r˜ does not depend on any of the
three tax rates considered. Fiscal revenues as a share of GDP are then
Rˆ
Yˆ
= (1− τN )(1− θ) + τC Cˆ
Yˆ
+
τA
1− τA r˜
Kˆ
Yˆ
.
B.1. Labor income tax. Let us first consider the labor income tax τN . As shown
above, Yˆ /Kˆ, Kˆ/H, Yˆ /H and Cˆ/H do not depend on τN . It follows that
∂
∂τN
(
Rˆ
Yˆ
)
= 1− θ > 0.
At the same time, we have
Rˆ
Yˆ
= g + τ + (r˜ − γ)b.
Since r˜ is tax invariant, assuming that τ is adjusted and b is fixed, one obtains
∂τ
∂τN
=
∂
∂τN
(
Rˆ
Yˆ
)
= 1− θ > 0.
Assuming instead that b is adjusted while τ is fixed, one obtains
∂b
∂τN
=
1
r˜ − γ
∂
∂τN
(
Rˆ
Yˆ
)
=
1− θ
r˜ − γ > 0,
since
r˜ − γ = (1 + γ)
(
1
β
− 1
)
> 0.
It follows that the relations between τN and τ and between τN and b are both
strictly increasing and thus one to one. It is equivalent to vary τN and adjust τ (b)
and to vary τ (b) and adjust τN .
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B.2. Consumption tax. Now, let us consider the consumption tax. Since Yˆ /H
and Cˆ/H do not depend on τN , it must be the case that
∂
∂τC
(
Rˆ
Yˆ
)
=
Cˆ
Yˆ
> 0.
Hence, by the same line of reasoning
∂τ
∂τC
=
∂
∂τC
(
Rˆ
Yˆ
)
=
Cˆ
Yˆ
> 0,
and
∂b
∂τC
=
1
r˜ − γ
∂
∂τC
(
Rˆ
Yˆ
)
=
1
r˜ − γ
Cˆ
Yˆ
> 0.
It follows that the relations between τC and τ and between τA and b are both
strictly increasing and thus one to one. It is equivalent to vary τC and adjust τ (b)
and to vary τ (b) and adjust τC .
B.3. Capital income tax. Finally, consider the capital income tax τA. Differen-
tiating the fiscal revenues-output ratio with respect to τA yields
∂
∂τA
(
Rˆ
Yˆ
)
= τC
∂
∂τA
(
Cˆ
Yˆ
)
+
r˜
1− τA
[
1
1− τA
Kˆ
Yˆ
+ τA
∂
∂τA
(
Kˆ
Yˆ
)]
.
In turn, using the relation derived in the proof of Proposition 1, we obtain
∂
∂τA
(
Kˆ
Yˆ
)
= − βθ(1 + γ − β){1 + γ − β[1− (1− τA)δ]}2 < 0
and
∂
∂τA
(
Cˆ
Yˆ
)
=
(γ + δ)βθ(1 + γ − β)
{1 + γ − β[1− (1− τA)δ]}2 > 0.
We thus obtain
∂
∂τA
(
Rˆ
Yˆ
)
=
θ(1 + γ − β)[τCβ(γ + δ) + 1 + γ − β(1− δ)]
{1 + γ − β[1− (1− τA)δ]}2 > 0.
Thus, by the same line of reasoning, since
∂
∂τA
(
Rˆ
Yˆ
)
= (r˜ − γ) ∂b
∂τA
=
∂τ
∂τA
,
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it follows that the relations between τA and τ and between τA and b are both
strictly increasing and thus one to one. It is equivalent to vary τA and adjust τ (b)
and to vary τ (b) and adjust τA.
B.4. Summing up. For each i ∈ {N,A,C}, we found that there exists a one-to-
one relationship between τ and τi and between b and τi. Thus, the Laffer curve
obtained by varying τi and letting τ (b) adjust coincides with the conditional Laffer
curve obtained by varying τ (b) and letting τi adjust. By Proposition 1, we thus
obtain that in an RA setup, the steady-state conditional Laffer curves coincide
exactly.
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Appendix C. Additional Results on the Laffer Curves Associated
with Capital Income and Consumption Taxes
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Figure C.1. Aggregate Variables - Laffer Curve on τA Conditional
on τ
Note: Aggregate variables as τA is varied and the transfer-output ratio τ is adjusted. The
black dotted line corresponds to the IM economy, and the dashed gray line corresponds to
the RA economy.
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Figure C.2. Aggregate Variables - Laffer Curve on τA Conditional
on b
Note: Aggregate variables as τA is varied and the debt-output ratio b is adjusted. The plain black line
corresponds to the IM economy, and the dashed gray line corresponds to the RA economy.
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Figure C.3. Aggregate Variables - Laffer Curve on τC Conditional
on τ
Note: Aggregate variables as τC is varied and the transfer-output ratio τ is adjusted. The black dotted
line corresponds to the IM economy, and the dashed gray line corresponds to the RA economy.
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Figure C.4. Aggregate Variables - Laffer Curve on τC Conditional
on b
Note: Aggregate variables as τC is varied and the debt-output ratio b is adjusted. The plain black line
corresponds to the IM economy, and the dashed gray line corresponds to the RA economy.
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APPENDIX A. MODEL
A.1. The Economic Environment. We consider a discrete time economy without aggregate risk similar to that stud-
ied in Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998). Time is indexed by t ∈ N. The final good Yt, which is the numeraire, is
produced by competitive firms, according to the technology
Yt = Kθt (ZtNt)
1−θ ,
where θ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the elasticity of production with respect to capital, Kt and Nt are the inputs of capital and
efficient labor, respectively, and Zt is an exogenous technical progress index evolving according to Zt+1 = (1+ γ)Zt,
with γ > 0 and Z0 = 1. Firms rent capital and efficient labor on competitive markets, at rates rt + δ and wt,
respectively. Here, δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the depreciation rate of physical capital, rt is the interest rate, and wt is the
wage rate.
The first order conditions for profit maximization are
rt + δ = θ
(
Kt
ZtNt
)θ−1
,
wt = (1− θ)Zt
(
Kt
ZtNt
)θ
.
The economy is populated with a continuum of ex ante identical, infinitely lived households. The typical house-
holds has utility given by
E
{
∞
∑
t=0
βt
[
1
1− σ
(
ct
Zt
)1−σ
− η
1+ χ
h1+χt
]
|a0, s0
}
,
where E0{·|a0, s0} is the mathematical expectation conditioned on the individual state at date 0. The individual state
consists of initial assets a0 and the exogenous individual state s0. Here, β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the discount factor, ct ≥ 0
is individual consumption, 0 ≤ ht ≤ 1 is the individual labor supply, σ > 0 is the relative risk aversion coefficient,
Patrick Fe`ve: Toulouse School of Economics, pfeve@univ-tlse1.fr.
Julien Matheron: Banque de France, julien.matheron@banque-france.fr.
Jean–Guillaume Sahuc: Banque de France, jean-guillaume.sahuc@banque-france.fr.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and should under no circumstances be interpreted as reflecting those of the Banque de
France.
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2 TECHNICAL APPENDIX
χ > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor, and η > 0 is a scaling constant. Consumption appears in deviation
from the index of technical progress to ensure a well-behaved balanced-growth path.
At the beginning of each period, households receive an individual productivity level e(st) > 0. We assume that st
is i.i.d. across agents and evolves over time according to a Markov process, with bounded support S and stationary
transition function Q(s, s′).1
An individual agent’s efficient labor is e(st)ht, with corresponding labor earnings given by (1 − τN)wte(st)ht,
where τN denotes the labor income tax. In addition, agents self-insure by accumulating at units of assets which pay
the after-tax rate of return (1− τA)rt, where τA denotes the capital income tax. These assets can consist of units of
physical capital and/or government bonds. Once arbitrage opportunities have been ruled out, each asset has the
same rate of return. Also, agents must pay a consumption tax τC. Finally, they perceive transfers Tt. Thus, an agent’s
budget constraint is
(1+ τC)ct + at+1 ≤ (1− τN)wte(st)ht + [1+ (1− τA)rt]at + Tt.
Borrowing is exogenously restricted by the following constraint
at+1 ≥ 0.
There is finally a government in the economy. The government issues debt Bt+1, collects tax revenues, rebates
transfers, and consumes Gt units of final good. The associated budget constraint is given by
Bt+1 = (1+ rt)Bt + Tt + Gt − (τArt At + τNwtNt + τCCt)
where Ct and At denote aggregate (per capita) consumption and assets held by the agents, respectively.
A.2. Equilibrium Defined. In the remainder of this paper, we focus exclusively on the steady state of an appropri-
ately normalized version of the above economy. Growing variables are rendered stationary by dividing them by Zt.
Variables so normalized are referred to with a hat. In the benchmark specification, the ratio of government expendi-
tures to output g ≡ Gˆ/Yˆ is constant. In the robustness section, we also consider an alternative case in which the level
of government expenditures Gˆ (in deviation from Zt) is constant.
We let A denote the set of possible values for assets aˆ. We let the joint distribution of agents across assets aˆ
and individual exogenous states s be denoted x(aˆ, s), defined on A ×S , the Borel subsets of A× S . Thus, for all
A0 × S0 ∈ A ×S , x(A0,S0) is the mass of agents with assets aˆ in A0 and individual state s in S0.
We can now write an agent’s problem in recursive form
v(aˆ, s) = max
cˆ,h,aˆ′
{
1
1− σ (cˆ)
1−σ − η
1+ χ
h1+χ + β
∫
S
v(aˆ′, s′)Q(s, ds′)
}
s.t. (1+ τC)cˆ + (1+ γ)aˆ′ ≤ (1− τN)wˆe(s)h + (1+ (1− τA)r)aˆ + Tˆ,
aˆ′ ≥ 0, cˆ ≥ 0, 0 ≤ h ≤ 1.
(A.1)
For convenience, we restrict aˆ to belong to the compact setA = [0, aˆM], where aˆM is a large number.2 We can thus
define a stationary, recursive equilibrium in the following way.
Definition 1. A steady-state, recursive competitive equilibrium is a constant system of prices {r, wˆ}, a vector of constant
policy variables (τC, τA, τN , Tˆ, Gˆ, Bˆ), a value function v(aˆ, s), time-invariant decision rules for an individual’s assets holdings,
consumption, and labor supply {ga(aˆ, s), gc(aˆ, s), gh(aˆ, s}, a measure x(aˆ, s) of agents over the state spaceA×S , and aggregate
quantities Aˆ ≡ ∫ aˆdx, Cˆ ≡ ∫ gc(aˆ, s)dx, N ≡ ∫ e(s)gh(aˆ, s)dx, and Kˆ such that:
(i) The value function v(aˆ, s) solves the agent’s problem stated in equation (A.1), with associated decision rules ga(aˆ, s),
gc(aˆ, s) and gh(aˆ, s);
1The transition Q has the following interpretation: for all s ∈ S and for all S0 ∈ S , where S denotes the Borel subsets of S , Q(s,S0) is the
probability that next period’s individual state lies in S0 when current state is s.
2aˆM is selected so that the decision rule on assets for an individual with the highest productivity and highest discount factor crosses the
45-degree line below aˆM .
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(ii) Firms maximize profits and factor markets clear, so that
wˆ = (1− θ)
(
Kˆ
N
)θ
,
r + δ = θ
(
Kˆ
N
)θ−1
,
(iii) Tax revenues equal government expenses
τNwˆN + τArAˆ + τCCˆ = Tˆ + Gˆ + (r− γ)Bˆ;
(iv) Aggregate savings equal firm’s demand for capital plus Government’s debt
Aˆ = Kˆ + Bˆ;
(v) The distribution x is invariant
x(A0,S0) =
∫
A0×S0
{∫
A×S
1{aˆ′=ga(aˆ,s)}Q(s, s
′)dx
}
da′ds′,
for all A0 × S0 ∈ A ×S , where 1{·} is an indicator function taking value one if the statement is true and zero
otherwise.
APPENDIX B. SOLUTION METHOD
Here, we describe how the model is solved assuming that the debt-output ratio b ≡ Bˆ/Yˆ and the different taxes
are already given and fixed.
We first assume that s takes on values in the discrete set S = {s1, . . . , sns} and has transition matrix pi, where ns
denotes the number of states for s.
In general terms, the algorithm involves the following steps.
Algorithm 1. Solving for the steady-state allocation
(1) Outer initialization: We first postulate an aggregate demand for effective labor Nd
(2) Generic iteration on Nd
(a) Inner initialization: We then postulate an interest rate r
(b) Generic iteration on r
(i) Given (r, Nd), one can deduce wˆ, Kˆ, Yˆ, Cˆ, Gˆ, Bˆ. Using the government budget constraint, one can then
back out the level of transfers
Tˆ = τArKˆ + τNwˆN + τCCˆ− [(1− τA)r− γ]Bˆ− Gˆ.
(ii) Given the above, one can then solve for the individual decision rules and for the implied distribution x, from
which one can deduce the aggregate supply of assets Aˆ and an aggregate supply of effective labor Ns
(c) The interest rate r is adjusted until Aˆ = Kˆ + Bˆ.
(3) Then, the aggregate demand for labor Nd is adjusted until Nd = Ns.
The procedure used to update the interest rate in step (c) is a hybrid bisection-secant method. After the first
iteration, r is updated as follows
rnew = θ
(
Aˆ− Bˆ
N
)θ−1
− δ.
Afterwards, the secant method on excess savings is activated. At each iteration, however, if the updated interest rates
lies outside the bisection bracket, the algorithm falls back to the bisection method. We use a simple secant method
on excess labor supply to update Nd.
Before we proceed, a remark is in order here. One may wonder whether the outer loop (i.e. the iterations on Nd)
is necessary in our setup. Imagine a version of the latter without fiscal policy (i.e. a Aiyagari (1994) like model with
endogenous labor supply). Postulating an interest rate r would be enough to solve for the individual problem. Using
the implied decision rule, one would find the aggregate supply of capital and the aggregate supply of labor and their
ratio. This is enough to adjust r until the previous ratio equals the analog ratio backed out from the firms’ first order
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conditions. By Walras law, if ones imposes that the goods market clears, the algorithm ensures automatically that
the labor market is cleared. So why is it that we need an extra loop to clear the labor market in our setup? This is
so because (i) we also need to balance the government’s budget constraint and (ii) solving the individual problem
requires that we know the level of transfers. However, knowing Tˆ requires knowledge of the level of Yˆ and hence
N (recall that r only gives us K/N). So the fiscal block of the model requires that an extra variable be adjusted. Of
course, an alternative strategy could consist in postulating a Tˆ and then finding the r that clears the capital market.
But once equilibrium on the goods and the labor market are imposed, we would still need to adjust Tˆ to balance the
government’s budget constraint. One way or another, an extra loop (be it on Nd or Tˆ) is needed.
Turning back to our original problem, each of the above steps entails specific developments which are detailed
below.
B.1. Solving for the Individual Decision Problem. Given an interest rate r and an aggregate, effective labor demand
Nd, we must solve for the agent decision problem. To this end, we resort to the Endogenous Grid Method (EGM), as
originally proposed by Carroll (2006). We set a grid of values for next period’s assets aˆ′, denoted by G1,a. In practice,
we use n1,a = 200 exponentially-spaced points on G1,a. Also, we define a numerical tolerance parameter ea.
The algorithm for solving for the individual decision rules is initialized by postulating an approximate decision
rule for aˆ′′, which we denote by g(0)a . Formally, g
(0)
a is a n1,a × ns matrix, where ns denotes the cardinal of the support
for s. The typical element [g(0)a ]ij is thus the level of assets that would be chosen at the end of next period if the agent
has assets aˆ′i and individual exogenous state sj at the beginning of next period.
Let us define next period’s cash on hand
mˆ′ = (1− τN)wˆe(s′)h′ + [1+ (1− τA)r]aˆ′ + Tˆ.
The difficulty in applying the EGM in the present setup is that next period’s cash on hand mˆ′ is not known a priori
before we solve for next period’s labor supply h′. Assuming an interior solution, combining the first-order condition
for labor supply and the household’s budget constraint, we obtain
F(h′) ≡ (1+ τC)
(
1
η
1− τN
1+ τC
wˆe(s′)
) 1
σ
(h′)−
χ
σ − (1− τN)wˆe(s′)h′ − R = 0,
where we defined
R = [1+ (1− τA)r]aˆ′ − (1+ γ)aˆ′′ + Tˆ.
Thus, we need to find the root of F(h) at each point of the grids on aˆ′ and s′, conditional on the postulated decision
rule ga(aˆ′, s′). Let the associated roots be denoted h˜(aˆ′, s′). We then have gh(aˆ′, s′) = h˜(aˆ′, s′).3
Thus, given r, wˆ and Tˆ (together with the other fiscal instruments, which at this stage are treated as parameters),
we resort to the following algorithm.
Algorithm 2. Solving for the individual decision rules
(1) Initialization: We first postulate a decision rule g(0)a
(2) At iteration j, proceed as follows
(a) Define
R(j)(aˆ′, s
′
) = [1+ (1− τA)r]aˆ′ − (1+ γ)g(j)a (aˆ′, s′) + Tˆ
and for all (aˆ′, s′) on G1,a × S , solve for the roots h˜(j)(aˆ′, s′) of
(1+ τC)
(
1
η
1− τN
1+ τC
wˆe(s′)
) 1
σ
(h′)−
χ
σ − (1− τN)wˆe(s′)h′ − R(j)(aˆ′, s′) = 0
an set
g(j)h (aˆ
′, s′) = h˜(j)(aˆ′, s′).
3In principle, an interior solution requires that h ∈ (0, 1) given our normalization of the time endowment. In practice, people never want to
work more than 1 unit of time and the utility function adopted in the paper ensures that people always devote a positive amount of their time
endowment to market activities.
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(b) Define next-period’s cash on hand
mˆ(aˆ′, s′) = (1− τN)wˆe(s′)g(j)h (aˆ′, s′) + [1+ (1− τA)r]aˆ′ + Tˆ
and solve for today’s cash on hand via the Euler equation
mˆ(aˆ, s) =
[
(1+ (1− τA)r) β1+ γ∑s′
piss′
(
mˆ(aˆ′, s′)− (1+ γ)g(j)a (aˆ′, s′)
)−σ]−1/σ
+ (1+ γ)aˆ′.
(c) Then, define the piecewise linear interpolant from the abscissas m(aˆ, s) and associated values aˆ′, and evaluate this
on the abscissas m(aˆ′, s′) to get an updated decision rule g(j+1)a (aˆ′, s′).
(d) If ||g(j+1)a (aˆ′, s′)− g(j)a (aˆ′, s′)|| < ea, stop, else return to (a).
Upon convergence, we define:
(1) Today’s labor supply
h(aˆ, s) =
[
1
η
(
mˆ(aˆ, s)− (1+ γ)aˆ′
1+ τC
)−σ 1− τN
1+ τC
wˆe(s)
]1/χ
;
(2) Today’s assets
aˆ =
m(aˆ, s)− Tˆ − (1− τN)wˆe(s)h(aˆ, s)
1+ (1− τA)r .
The levels of today’s assets form the endogenous grid of assets, which is denoted by EG1,a.
B.2. Solving for the Invariant Distribution. After having solved for the individual decision problem, we must solve
for the equilibrium steady-state distribution. To this end, we let p¯i denote the vector collecting the stationary proba-
bility distribution induced by pi.
We then set a new grid G2,a for aˆ′, much finer than the previous one (in practice, we use 100,000 exponentially
spaced points). We use n2,a to denote the number of grid points. Using interpolation techniques, we find the asso-
ciated grid for aˆ corresponding to G2,a, which we label EG2,a. Thus, for each (aˆ′, s) on G2,a × S , the corresponding
point on EG2,a ×S gives g−1a (aˆ′, s). We also define a new grid for h on G2,a ×S , which we label G2,h. This is done by
interpolating the decision rule gh(aˆ′, s′) for h on G2,a.
We then initialize a CDF F(0) on the joint grid G2,a × S as
F(0)(aˆ′, s′) = aˆ
′ − aˆmin
aˆmax − aˆmin p¯is′ .
Notice that this CDF is defined on end-of-period assets aˆ′. Also, we define a numerical tolerance parameter eF. Once
again, F(0) is an n2,a × ns matrix.
Algorithm 3. Solving for the invariant distribution of agents
(1) Initialization: We first postulate an initial CDF on G2,a × S , denoted by F(0)(aˆ′, s′).
(2) At iteration j, we proceed as follows:
(a) For each s ∈ S , we interpolate F(j)(·, s) on EG2,a. We thus obtain a CDF defined on beginning-of-period assets aˆ,
which we denote by Fˆ(j)(·, s). We then update the CDF according to
F(j+1)(aˆ′, s′) =
ns
∑
s=1
piss′ Fˆ
(i)(g−1a (aˆ′, s), s).
(b) We then relocate the probability masses according to
F(i+1)(aˆ′, s) = 0 if g−1a (aˆ′, s) < 0,
F(i+1)(aˆ′, s) = p¯is if g−1a (aˆ′, s) > aˆM,
and then re-normalize F(j+1).
(c) If ||F(i+1) − F(i)|| < eF, we stop, else we go back to step (a).
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Upon convergence, we use the obtained CDF to compute Aˆ, H, and Ns using the piece-wise linear approximation
of F obtained above:
Aˆ =
ns
∑
s=1
(
F(aˆ1, s)aˆ1 +
n2,a
∑
i=2
(F(aˆi, s)− F(aˆi−1, s)) aˆi + aˆi−12
)
,
H =
ns
∑
s=1
(
F(aˆ1, s)gh(aˆ1, s) +
n2,a
∑
i=2
(F(aˆi, s)− F(aˆi−1, s)) gh(aˆi, s) + gh(aˆi−1, s)2
)
,
Ns =
ns
∑
s=1
(
F(aˆ1, s)e(s)gh(aˆ1, s) +
n2,a
∑
i=2
(F(aˆi, s)− F(aˆi−1, s))e(s) gh(aˆi, s) + gh(aˆi−1, s)2
)
,
B.3. Exogenous Idiosyncratic Shocks and Calibration. Se and pi(e) are constructed in the following way. We assume
that log(et) follows an AR(1) process
log(et) = ρe log(et−1) + σeet, et ∼ N(0, 1).
We interpret log(et) as the residual persistent and idiosyncratic part of the log-wage rate in the specification adopted
by Kaplan (2012), once experience and individual fixed-effects have been accounted for. In the latter paper, the
estimation results based on year effects yield ρe = 0.958 and σe =
√
0.017. We approximate this AR(1) process via
the Kopecky and Suen (2010) method, using ne = 7 points. This yields a transition matrix p˜i.
In the spirit of Kindermann and Krueger (2014), we then allow for an eighth state corresponding to a very high
labor productivity. As they argue, such a states is a reduced form for entrepreneurial or artistic opportunities yielding
very high labor income. The final transition matrix is then
pi =

p˜i11(1− p8) · · · p˜i14(1− p8) · · · p˜ii17(1− p8) p8
...
...
...
...
p˜i71(1− p8) · · · p˜i74(1− p8) · · · p˜i77(1− p8) p8
0 · · · 1− p88 · · · 0 p88
 .
Here, p8 is the probability of reaching the eighth productivity state from any normal productivity level. Also p88 is
the probability of staying in the high labor income state conditional on being there.
This specification of labor income shocks gives us three parameters (p8, p88, e8) which we adjust until we match
the Gini coefficient of the wealth distribution, the share of wealth held by the 20% richest, and the Gini coefficient of
the labor earning distribution.
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APPENDIX C. ADDITIONAL RESULTS ON THE COMPARISON OF LAFFER CURVES FOR ALTERNATIVE DEBT-OUTPUT
RATIOS
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FIGURE C.1. Aggregate Variables - Labor Income Tax τN Varied
Note: Aggregate variables as τN is varied and the transfer-output ratio τ is adjusted. The plain black line corresponds to the benchmark IM economy. The dashed
black line corresponds the IM economy when b is calibrated to −0.5. The dashed grey line corresponds to the RA economy.
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FIGURE C.2. Aggregate Variables - Capital Income Tax τA Varied
Note: Aggregate variables as τA is varied and the transfer-output ratio τ is adjusted. The plain black line corresponds to the benchmark IM economy. The dashed
black line corresponds the IM economy when b is calibrated to −0.5. The dashed grey line corresponds to the RA economy.
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FIGURE C.3. Aggregate Variables - Consumption Tax τC Varied
Note: Aggregate variables as τC is varied and the transfer-output ratio τ is adjusted. The plain black line corresponds to the benchmark IM economy. The dashed black
line corresponds the IM economy when b is calibrated to −0.5. The dashed grey line corresponds to the RA economy.
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